I should start out by saying that the title I chose for this article (which is meant to be taken literally, more on that in a moment) wasn't the first which suggested itself. Because the image I've got in my mind is a duck screaming: "AfPak! AfPak!" But I felt that was too frivolous a title to use for a very "not-frivolous" subject.

Still, the image remains. The media has apparently discovered that we have troops in Afghanistan. This may come as a shock to some, since the mainstream media (at least on television) have pretty much ignored this fact for around seven years now (so much so that Afghanistan became known as "the forgotten war" for a while). But the reporting on what President Obama is going to do next in Afghanistan has been so over-the-top in the past few weeks, it has astonished me (and I do not astonish easily, especially when it comes to the idiocy of the evening news). More stories have run on Afghanistan, I would be willing to venture, in the past two weeks than have run in the past two years.

Which is why I settled on the much-less-provocative title I did. Because in all this talk of what Obama should do next, the media seems to have a very selective case of amnesia. Or perhaps they are just severely memory-impaired or logically-challenged. With today's media, it's certainly possible. But then, to paraphrase a fired Secretary of Defense, we go to war with the media we have, not with the media we'd like to have.

So instead of sweeping conclusions about the situation on the ground in Afghanistan, the very public battle over what military strategy to implement there, or what would be a "successful" conclusion to the war (all worthy subjects, for another column perhaps); today instead I'd just like to snipe from afar over the way we are having this public debate. Because it seems to me there are quite a few very important points which are simply not being made currently, by any "side" in this debate. Meaning that no matter what your stance on what to do next, you may find you agree with at least a few of these.

In no particular order, then, here are my observations so far.

Obama has already "surged" our troops in Afghanistan

OK, I lied. This is first on the list because it is the biggest elephant in the room -- the fact which, for some bizarre reason, no one ever mentions. Obama has already "doubled down" our presence in the Afghanistan. President Bush never sent more than a fraction of the troops into Afghanistan that he ultimately would send to Iraq. When President Obama took office, there were between 30,000 and 40,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Obama, almost immediately, sent in almost 30,000 more troops. Some of these troops may (media reports vary, astonishingly enough in the midst of such a media frenzy on the topic) not even have arrived in the country yet.

What is truly astonishing is that this fact is so rarely mentioned. It seems to me -- no matter which side of the debate you're on -- that this would be a point to make to back up your position. For those advocating more troops, it could be phrased: "We've sent more in, and they're doing a better job, but it just proves we need more." For those advocating a halt to troop increases, it could be put as: "We've already 'surged' and we should give Obama's first 'surge' a chance to work." In other words, it really could be spun either way.

Instead, it is blatantly ignored by both sides in the debate -- aided and abetted by the media itself. When talking of 40,000 more troops, it is much more accurate and intellectually honest (no matter which side of the debate you're on) to say "Obama is considering tripling-down our presence in Iraq, after he already has doubled-down the troop levels there."

Generals always ask for more troops

This is a basic fact. It is so basic, it applies not only to the military but to corporate America as well, where they even have a term for it: "empire building." Show me an instance where any military commander in the field has said: "You know what? We have too many troops, we should free some of them up so other generals can utilize them better." It just doesn't happen, folks. Generals are always happier when they have more troops under their command. And they always ask for more.

Now, I'm not saying this to denigrate General McChrystal's specific position. He may well be right in requesting 40,000 more troops. I don't have access to the data he does, and even if I did I doubt I would know what to do with it, seeing as how I am not a military strategist or tactician. So let me be perfectly clear -- I am talking generalities (no pun intended) here. But this generality should at least be mentioned to put General McChrystal's position into some relevant context. Which has been absent from the debate about his troop request. I have yet to see one "journalist" on television state this fact "...of course, generals always ask for more troops, this is a historic fact..." in any of their "reporting."

The calendar [Part I]

The media, thankfully, has backed off a bit from last week's breathless reporting that "Obama has to act by four in the afternoon tomorrow, or else the Afghan war is lost." When the whole debate erupted in the media (due to McChrystal leaking his report to the president before the good general gave it to his commander-in-chief), the storyline immediately became all about the immediacy. Obama was losing the war by dragging his feet, or Obama was losing the war because of his indecisiveness, or similar sky-is-falling themes were prevalent.

As I said, thankfully, the media has realized the ridiculousness of this position and backed off a bit this week, instead turning to a more sober discussion of the choices Obama faces (more on what they were talking about before this sober discussion in a moment). All it really took for them to realize the idiocy of their position was a reminder that President George W. Bush took three months to mull over his Iraq "surge" policy before he decided upon it, and announced it to the world.

You know what? I wasn't a fan of Bush's "surge." But I do not believe that at any time either during the debate or after Bush decided did I (or the mainstream media) chastise Bush for not acting fast enough. I could be wrong about that, but I simply don't recall any such debate. Intelligent adults realize that wars are big, complicated things. Sweeping strategic decisions have vast implications on the ground, especially when it comes to the logistics of getting men and supplies where they need to be in a timely manner. So if we're contemplating a large change in a war's strategy, you don't want it to be a shoot-from-the-hip snap decision, you want it to be a reasoned, well-thought-out plan. Which holds true for Obama as much as it did for Bush.

Which, as I said, the media finally did realize, and backed down from their earlier breathlessness. But the argument "Obama's dragging his feet, which will doom us all" is still made in some quarters.

The calendar [Part II]

In Afghanistan, because much of the fighting either takes place in mountainous regions, or mountain passes are used for troops to travel, there are "seasons" of war. And winter is the season when the least fighting takes place. The Taliban troops all pull back to Pakistan for the winter (while the mountain passes are closed due to snow), regroup, and plan their spring offensive. We do the same, on "our" side of the mountains.

What is being discussed by Obama and his advisors right now is the strategy for next spring. Obama could order in 40,000 troops tomorrow, but (1) they wouldn't arrive any time soon (the Army just doesn't move that fast), and (2) they won't really be needed for months anyway.

This is why there is nowhere near the pressure on Obama which the media tried to put on him. There simply is no rush, because winter is coming and the snow is about to fly. Next spring is when any strategy (again, no matter what strategy you advocate) will take effect. So taking an extra week now to get it right is not going to change anything.

Who said anything about a pullout?

President Obama himself had to smack down this ridiculous and false "either/or" choice, which was made up out of whole cloth by the media (unless, to be charitable, it was fed to them by Republicans wishing to tarnish Obama or "put him in a box") -- the notion that Obama could either (a) send in the 40,000 troops McChrystal was about to request, or (b) immediately pull every American troop out of Afghanistan.

Again, I have no idea where choice (b) came from, since nobody outside the media had mentioned the idea previous to the media's obsession over it last week. It's not like Dennis Kucinich was named Secretary of Defense while we all weren't looking, or anything. President Obama has already doubled down on Afghanistan, and not (as the media tried to set up) someone who has ever advocated pulling everything out of Afghanistan (see: Obama's entire presidential campaign and term in office so far). Which makes it all the more puzzling why the media can't seem to remember this simple fact.

The media delightfully played this game during the presidential election last year, when they tried to present the choices in Iraq as a duality -- either a "precipitous withdrawal" or a "100-year war," as if there were no points on the spectrum between these two insane choices. The media did a disservice to both candidates at the time, and they were attempting to do the same disservice to President Obama last week.

Until Obama himself, in the first meeting he held this week on the issue, put it to rest. He specifically said that this is not a choice between (a) 40,000 more troops, and (b) immediate and total withdrawal. This sort of thing looks obvious when someone points out the fact that the media empire has no clothes, but it's always amazing how the herd mentality of the inside-the-Beltway media portrays things at times, in hindsight.

The Taliban is not Al Qaeda

Again, the media is slowly getting better on this one. The Taliban is a distinct and separate problem from Al Qaeda. They may be (to use an old anti-Communist term) "fellow travelers," but they are not one and the same, and to equate them in this fashion is counter-productive to the discussion about what to do about either group.

Al Qaeda is a terrorist group with Osama Bin Laden at its head, which sees itself as being at war with the United States (and the rest of the West). These are the folks who flew airplanes into buildings. They plotted these attacks from "safe havens" given to them by the Taliban in Afghanistan.

The Taliban has a longer history, and is much more focused on controlling Afghanistan. When we pulled out of supporting the mujahedeen (see: Charlie Wilson's War) after the Soviets left the country in the 1980s, a power vacuum developed quickly. The country retrogressed to "warlordism" and the United States labeled it a "failed state" -- and essentially washed our hands of the whole affair. This led to the eventual rise of the Taliban. They took over the country (or, more accurately, "pulled the country back together again"), and set up their very harsh version of Islamic rule. These are the guys who blew up ancient statues because of religious reasons, remember. But when they came into power, many Afghanis (at first) welcomed them, because order (even a stringent theocracy) was much better than the absolute chaos which preceded it.

We deposed the Taliban after 9/11. We kicked them out, with the help of some local resistance groups, and set up the Kharzai government in their place. They've been fighting back ever since, in an effort to gain back control of the country. That is the Taliban's objective.

Now, I draw no conclusions here about the best strategy for defeating either the Taliban or Al Qaeda -- I am merely pointing out that they are two distinct enemies, each with their own goals and their own reasons for fighting. In any debate about "what to do" in Afghanistan, it behooves whoever is advocating this position or that to address these two very separate groups in specific and separate ways.

Why Afghanistan is not Iraq [Part I] -- Talibanistan

Afghanistan is not Iraq. This is patently obvious to anyone familiar with the concept in physics that two things may not occupy the same space. Or, for that matter, to anyone with a map.

Kidding aside, though, there is a real danger of oversimplifying the Afghanistan situation by suggesting that "this is what worked in Iraq, let's try it in Afghanistan" -- no matter what the actual suggestion is. There are two reasons for this; one geographical, and one political.

Geographically, there is a gigantic problem in Afghanistan which we just did not face in Iraq. Call it the "Talibanistan" problem. The region which is used as a base by the Taliban is quite possibly the most "ungovernable" region on Earth. And yet an artificial line on a map runs right through it -- the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. But, in reality, this is a "tribal" area -- a concept with which most Americans are unfamiliar (and somewhat uncomfortable even thinking about). What this means is: (1) the "border" doesn't matter, because the tribal organizations have been there many centuries longer than that line on a map, and they fully expect to be there many centuries longer than the line itself survives; and (2) the central governments in both Afghanistan and Pakistan have never been able to exercise much control over the region -- no matter who is in power at the time.

While this is akin in some ways to the "Kurdistan" problem in the Iraqi region (an old association of peoples who got shafted when the lines on the map were being drawn up by Westerners, and hence have no country of their own), that's about as far as any analogy should go. Because the Taliban is a very different kettle of fish than the Kurds. Plus, the Kurds were the most pro-American group in Iraq, from the very beginning.

Exacerbating America's problem, we have a much freer hand militarily in Afghanistan than we do in Pakistan, meaning that the Taliban in essence has a "safe harbor" to retreat to where we have limited military influence. This makes the war much tougher than in Iraq, where such a thing (no matter how much the Iran/Iraq supposed "links" were played up at the time) simply was not true.

Why Afghanistan is not Iraq [Part II] -- the "Taliban Awakening"

A large part of changing the game during the "surge" in Iraq was the buying-off of the Sunni militias. Let us not mince words. What we did was exactly the same as someone paying "protection money" to the mob. Groups of armed men who had previously been killing American soldiers decided that it was time to switch their allegiance (they were getting fed up with Al Qaeda In Mesopotamia, making it easier to convince them to switch sides). They stopped killing Americans, and instead started supporting the American effort (the whole "enemy of my enemy" thing). One of the main reasons they did so is that we started paying them.

This was given lofty and noble monikers by us (the "Sunni Awakening" is the one we all settled on, eventually). But when stripped of rhetoric, we paid off armed gangs so they wouldn't shoot us any more, and instead shoot the other people who were also shooting at us.

But again, Afghanistan -- as tempting as it is for military planners to draw parallels -- is not Iraq. Because the equivalent in Afghanistan would be to start paying off the Taliban, and getting them to turn on their Al Qaeda cohorts. This is not as insane an idea as it originally sounds, because loyalties in this part of the world are even more fluid than in Iraq. So, conceivably, this could actually work. We could get the Taliban (who are the vast majority of the fighters on the other side of the battlefield, it should be pointed out, as opposed to the much-smaller Al Qaeda) to stop shooting at us, and instead help us destroy Al Qaeda.

But such a "Taliban Awakening" would be disastrous politically -- both here and in Afghanistan. Because in this case, it's not really about money. The Taliban have been doing quite well exploiting the fact that ever since the U.S. invaded, the opium crop has been exploding (and so have the profits). In this case, it would likely involve concessions of territory. We might agree to "give up" on certain provinces in Afghanistan, and essentially turn them over to Taliban control. They would then set up their harsh theocratic government there, and we would have to accept all the ugly ramifications of them doing so.

Politically, at home, this would be very hard (if not impossible) to spin. We would be seen by the rest of the world (rightly so) of simply "selling out" the people in those provinces, and sacrificing them to expediency. To say nothing of what the Afghans themselves would think of us.

But the real danger with this scheme is the old joke about what constitutes an "honest cop" or an "honest politician" (answer: one who stays bought). Because, after they get some actual territory semi-officially under their control, there would be nothing to stop the Taliban from "turning their turban" once again (yes, this phrase is actually used in the region), and allowing Al Qaeda (very quietly, no doubt) to set up their terrorist camps once again (this is what started the whole problem, remember).

Kharzai and the future governance of Afghanistan

The biggest problem in Afghanistan, one that did indeed have Iraqi parallels for a while, is that the central government is somewhat of a joke. The country's titular leader, President Hamid Kharzai is contemptuously called "the Mayor of Kabul" by his own countrymen, because his influence (and the reach of the central government) pretty much ends at the city limits. The Afghan government simply does not control most of the country, and indeed has very little influence over it. Add to this the fact that what government there is seems to be the traditional (for the region) "kleptocracy," where having a "government job" means "to become rich by demanding bribes from absolutely everyone who walks by your door." The corruption is so deep and so ingrained that it's hard to picture it changing at any time in the near future.

And on top of all this, Kharzai appears to have stolen the recent "election" to regain control of the country. It's pretty hard for us to, one the one hand, denounce Iran for their fraudulent recent "election," while at the same time keeping in power with our military someone who just as blatantly stole the Afghan "election." Kharzai is not exactly George Washington, in other words, "first in the hearts of his countrymen."

Conclusion

That's a false promise, because I really have none here. But I had to call the final paragraphs something....

The only conclusion to be drawn from all of this is actually an easy one and has nothing to do with what President Obama should or shouldn't do in Afghanistan. The overwhelming conclusion is a familiar refrain, unfortunately. The problem is a complex one. Solutions will be complex, by definition. Relative success or failure might not be apparent when it happens. Nobody's going to be happy with every facet of any decision. It is a subject worthy of studying (and of debate), in the hopes of getting it right and making the right decisions.

In other words, it is precisely that kind of intricate issue which today's media simply cannot handle very well. Look for "either/or" descriptions of the problem, instead. Look for simplistic answers to be bandied about by many sides. Look for the media to miss out on three-fourths of the real debate happening around the National Security Council table. Look for either jingoism ("Send in more troops! More!") or defeatism ("It's a lost cause, always was -- they don't call it the 'Graveyard of Empires' for nothing!") or other such simplistic summations of the problem. But don't look to the media for easy answers, because there simply aren't any (if there ever were) when it comes to Afghanistan. I think everyone's in agreement on that last one.

-- Chris Weigant